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BLACK WOMEN, GENDER EQUITY AND
THE FUNCTION AT THE JUNCTION
ALFRED DENNIS MATHEWSON*
After teaching sports law for several years, I am struck that few peo-
ple can articulate a coherent general thesis of what gender equity means
or a clear vision of what the athletic picture will look like when it has
been attained.' The law of gender equity, however, is not so difficult to
find. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983) and Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended by the Education Amendments of 1972,2 are the major sources
of American gender equity law.3 The Equal Protection Clause has been
used to address gender based discrimination in government sponsored
athletics activities. Section 1983 has been used to challenge the exclu-
sion of girls from sports activities using public facilities. Title IX, which
is among the legislative progeny of Equal Protection jurisprudence, has
been used to address disparities in the treatment of boys and girls in
athletic programs within educational systems that receive federal
funding.4
* Copyright 1995. Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. This essay is dedicated
to my sister Mary Elizabeth Davis, who proudly wore the maroon and gold for the Trojanettes
basketball team of the now defunct W.A. Pattillo High School in Tarboro, North Carolina. I
wish to thank my research assistant, Victoria Perdue, without whom this essay could not have
been completed.
1. See B. Glenn George, Who Plays and Who Pays: Defining Equality in Intercollegiate
Athletics, 1995 Wxs. L. R.Ev. 647; Wendy Olson, Beyond Title IX Toward an Agenda for Wo-
men and Sports in the 1990's, 3 YALE J.L. & FEmInsM 105 (1990). Scholars are not the only
ones in the dark. Administrators have expressed similar comments. Dick Shultz, former Ex-
ecutive Director of the NCAA, in an interview after the 87th NCAA convention in 1993
stated that gender equity was one of the most important issues facing the organization's mem-
bers. He added: "First of all, we've got to define gender equity." Larry McMillen, NCAA
Quietly Sets Agenda at Convention, NEw ORLEANS TimEs-PICAYUNE, Jan. 17, 1993, at C6.
2. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. (1994).
3. Several states have Equal Rights Amendments in their constitutions that also have
been applied in gender equity cases. See, e.g., Williams v. School Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d
168 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 689 (1994); Blair v. Washington State Univ., 740 P.2d
1379 (Wash. 1987). For a history of gender equity litigation, see Diane Heckman, Women &
Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX, 9 U. MIAMI Er. & SPORTS L. Rnv. 1
(1992).
4. "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Education Amendments of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-318, § 901, 444 (1972) (emphasis added).
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In my view, the difficulty in defining gender equity results in part
because gender equity principles, rooted in equality jurisprudence, are
applied to a setting in which a normative goal is the attainment of ine-
quality. The ultimate objective of athletics competition is superiority.5
Considering this inherent contradiction, it is no wonder that there is such
debate over whether gender equity precludes any discrimination based
on gender, as many males argue, 6 or means the remediation of the his-
torical discouragement and exclusion of girls and women from participa-
tion in athletics competition.7
The lack of coherent principles is exemplified by the intersection of
gender equity with racial justice. Some commentators, for example,
have argued that gender equity results in the displacement of Black
males with middle and upper class white women.8 Professors Weiler and
Roberts have observed some interesting racial dynamics of gender eq-
uity in practice. They note that Black student athletes, both men and
women, are concentrated in sports generating over ninety percent of the
total revenue in NCAA Division 1-A.9 Their subtle observation is that
the current regime results in a transfer of wealth from poor Blacks to
middle class Whites. They leave unstated the obvious implication from
the inclusion of this observation in their discussion of gender equity. To
the extent that legal rules underlying gender equity compel the creation
of additional non-revenue sports for women in educational institutions,
Black student athletes, and Black males in particular, have been re-
quired to fund them.
5. This is perhaps the male model of competitive athletics. Some commentators have
questioned its use as the standard for the development of athletics for competitive athletics for
women. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 1, in which the author provides a history of women's
athletics in the twentieth century and argues, among other things, that sports as an institution
may be different for women.
6. Kelley v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S.Ct. 938 (1995).
7. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993); Cohen v. Brown
Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
8. Walter B. Connolly, Jr. & Jeffrey D. Adelman, A University's Defense to a Title IX
Gender Equity in Athletics Lawsuit: Congress Never Intended Gender Equity Based on a Stu-
dent Body Ratios, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 845 (1994).
9. PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. RoBERnS, SPoRTS AND ThE LAW 623 (1993). They relied
upon data drawn from the American Institutes for Research, Studies of Intercollegiate Athlet-
ics, Report No. 3: The Experiences of Black Intercollegiate Athletes at NCAA Division 1 Institu-
tions (1989), which show that Black males constituted 37% of football players, 56% of men
basketball players and 33% of women basketball players, while Black men and women com-
prised only 8% of the student athletes in the nonrevenue sports. See also T. Jesse Wilde,
Gender Equity in Athletics: Coming of Age in the 90's, 4 MARO. SPORTS L.. 217, 250 (1994).
[Vol. 6.239
GENDER EQUITY AND BLACK WOMEN
I do not propose to address in any substantial way the effect of gen-
der equity on Black males in this essay.10 Nor do I intend to present a
coherent thesis of gender equity as my views are still in an evolutionary
stage. This article is not an attack on gender equity, and readers who
hope to find fodder to slow down its momentum will be disappointed. I
am, however, going to examine the meaning of gender equity for Black
women and sketch a general framework for principles to aid the formu-
lation of sports policy on gender equity as it applies to Black women.
This framework may illumine ideas useful in evolution of the related law
of gender equity as well, but any such effect would be a mere by-product
of the roughly shaped ideas I express below.
I. GENDER EQurry AND BLACK WOMEN: THE INTRODUCTION
In Beyond Title IX Toward an Agenda for Women and Sports in the
1990's, Wendy Olson observed that Title IX "has done little to address
the diverse needs and problems.., of women of color..."" She dis-
cussed some of the theories explaining the lack of participation of Black
girls and women at the high school and collegiate level.' 2 Her intent was
to acknowledge her awareness of its existence. 13 Scholars such as
Kimberle Crenshaw and Angela Harris have provided theoretical
frameworks for analyzing this problem, although they have not yet fo-
cused on women of color in sports. Professor Crenshaw in Demarginal-
izing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,4
and Professor Harris in Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal The-
10. I recognize that Black males suffer and have suffered from racial discrimination in
American sports systems. There is ample literature on this subject. See, e.g., Linda S. Greene,
The New Rules of the Game: Academic Integrity or Racism?, 28 ST. Louis UNIV. L.J. 101
(1984); Timothy Davis, The Myth of the Superspade: The Persistence of Racism in College
Athletics, 22 FORDHAM URnB. LJ. 615 (1995). In this article, I wish to acknowledge that Black
women, too, have suffered from the forces of discrimination.
11. Olson, supra note 1, at 127.
12. See text infra at 11. Olson's own view was that the Black girls and women chose not
participate because of the lack of professional opportunities. Olson, supra note 1, at 128. The
apparent argument is that Black boys and men chose athletics in the numbers that they do
because it provides a pathway to success. That pathway is not available to Black girls and
women, so they choose other routes.
13. Olson cited some observations set forth in THE WomENs SPORTS FOUNDATION, THE
WSF REPoRI-: MiNourrns iN SPOR-S (1989) on differences in the effect of sports on women
of color. For example, the data in the Report indicated that Black women who participated in
high school athletics encountered difficulty in entering the work force outside athletics, and
that Hispanic women who participated in high school sports benefitted from that participation
more so than any other group.
14. 1989 UNiv. CHi. L. F. 139.
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ory,15 argue that conventional race based antidiscrimination theory and
feminist theory ignore the intersectionality of race and gender and thus
provide an inadequate framework for fully addressing the needs of wo-
men of color.
I do not claim to "get it," but I, nevertheless, am going to attempt to
draw upon the theoretical propositions advanced by Professors Cren-
shaw and Harris. I am intrigued by their use of mathematical models to
describe the legal intersection of race and gender and the concept of
essentialism. Although Professors Crenshaw and Harris outline general
approaches to the needs of sundry groups of women of color, their em-
phasis is on Black women, and I would venture to say that they would
maintain that legal rules which address Black women might not neces-
sarily be appropriate for other women of color. I will follow that conclu-
sion and limit the analysis and propositions set forth here to Black
women except as I otherwise indicate. Both works reach similar
conclusions.
Professor Crenshaw argues that conventional antidiscrimination law
employs a single axis model that does not account for the multiple physi-
cal and experiential dimensions of Black women, including but not lim-
ited to, race and gender. 6 Conventional legal analysis uses a single axis
analysis to examine the action of the force of discrimination on one di-
mension at a time.' 7 The use of the single axis leads to mathematical
descriptives to describe the dimensions of the social phenomenon of the
Black woman. The descriptives are necessarily linear equations, each of
which denote a vertical or horizontal line. I had originally thought the
linear equations and the vertical and horizontal lines might enhance an
explanation of the intersection of race and gender. For example, if the
experiences of Black women were two dimensional, they could be de-
scribed by a vertical race line and a horizontal gender line, or vice-versa.
My observation that the intersection occurs at a single point on both
lines underscores the inadequacy of the single axis analysis, but some-
how does not clearly illuminate Professor Crenshaw's argument.
Professor Harris' analysis is similar and explicitly utilizes linear equa-
tions to explain the law's treatment of Black women.18 She used in-
dependent variables or elements where Professor Crenshaw used
15. 42 STAN. L. Rnv. 581 (1990).
16. Crenshaw, supra note 14.
17. Legal rules consist of elements that are analyzed separately. Factual circumstances
relevant to a given element are analyzed to see if the requisite element is present.
18. Harris, supra note 15, at 588. "The result of essentialism is to reduce the lives of peo-
ple who experience multiple forms of oppression to addition problems: 'racism + sexism =
[Vol. 6:239
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dimensions. The number of elements in the equation may be infinite.
She observed that the law's treatment of Black woman as a sum of sev-
eral independent elements, and her legal rights depend upon each one.19
The observation suggests that legal rules treat the Black woman's life as
a "mixture" of physical and experiential elements, including but not lim-
ited to, race, gender, and sexuality; the law through conventional legal
analysis uses some sort of magnetic or other attractive force to deal with
one element at a time to the exclusion of other elements. Professor Har-
ris uses the concept of "essentialism"20 to make her point. Each element
in the equation has an essential character that may be far different than
what a Black woman is. The essence of gender is a white woman
model;2 the essence of Blacks is a Black male model. 2
When the two analyses are studied together, the physical phenomena
they describe is more important than the mathematical descriptives.
Professor Crenshaw's multidimensional analysis reveals an interaction of
race and gender that is much larger and more complex than a single
point. The attention to the intersection distracts from the action occur-
ring at the intersection. Professor Harris' analysis indicates that Black
women, or any group for that matter, is better described by more com-
plex functions, i.e., Black women = f(race x gender x sexuality). What
both scholars demonstrate is that antidiscrimination jurisprudence is
misled by this complex function, which distracts from the action at the
intersection or the "function at the junction."
The two works demonstrate that the forces of race and gender dis-
crimination act simultaneously or sequentially on Black women. Profes-
sor Crenshaw, in fact, uses the metaphor of an accident at an intersection
to show this idea.23 The confluence of the forces normally should be
expected to produce greater harm than either force acting alone. More
importantly, the simultaneous forces may cause an injury that in many
cases may be different from that which would occur from either force
straight black women's experience,' or 'racism + sexism + homophobia = black lesbian
experience."
19. Id.
20. Professor Crenshaw draws upon the works of Catherine MacKinnon and Robin West.
Iii at 585-95. "Essentialism' is "the notion that a unitary, 'essential' women's experience can
be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities
of experience." Id. at 585.
21. Id. at 585-95.
22. Professor Harris directs her attention to essentialism in feminist theory. It is Profes-
sor Crenshaw who also critiques antiracist theory and makes this point. Crenshaw, supra note
14, at 141-52, 160-67.
23. Id. at 149.
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acting independently of the other. The effect of this different harm in
the law is the systemic failure to recognize that Black women have been
injured by each force. It also imposes the impossible burden of sorting
out for the judicial system what harm was caused by racial discrimination
so that they are essentially like Black men, what harm was caused by
gender discrimination so that they are essentially like white women, and
what harm was added by the force or confluence of the forces that
uniquely affect them as Black women.
Professor Crenshaw raises an additional point. When it comes to dis-
crimination, Black women may claim membership in at least three
classes. 24 First, they belong to the class injured by the force of racial
discrimination. Second, they are members of the class injured by the
force of gender discrimination. Finally, they are members of the class
injured by the combined forces of racial and gender discrimination. But
Professor Crenshaw goes a step beyond when she argues that "some-
times, [Black women] experience discrimination as Black women."'
She is arguing that there is a force of discrimination that acts only on
Black women. Black women are the only members of the class so
affected.
Professor Harris's use of essentialism allows me to make the point in
a different way. As I stated above, she sees the law as treating the exper-
iences of Black women as a mixture of independent experiential ele-
ments that may be acted upon separately by the forces of discrimination
without regard to the other elements. If the mixture were actually a
compound or solution, it would have properties that are different from
the sum of the properties of the individual elements. Those new proper-
ties might cause it to be subject to forces that would not act upon the
individual elements. I can not say whether this force is a force of racial
discrimination or of gender discrimination or something entirely differ-
ent. Perhaps, by so stating, I have committed the same offense to which
Professors Crenshaw and Harris are so critical. Nevertheless, I honestly
do not know.
These propositions may be observed in the context of gender equity.
The current law of gender equity provides a remedy to Black women,
but only to the extent they are injured by the force of gender discrimina-
tion like that faced by white women. It does not provide a remedy to
them to the extent that their participation in competitive athletics is and
has been impacted by the force of racial discrimination or the simultane-
24. Id.
25. Id. at 149.
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ous action of both forces. Nor does the law of gender equity provide
them a remedy to the extent such participation has been impacted by
any force of discrimination directed specifically toward Black women.
II. GENDER EQurrY - THE ELABORATION
A. Single Axis/Essential Element
In this section, I will examine the single axis of gender and the "es-
sential women" aided by the law of gender equity. The phrase "gender
equity" was coined to describe efforts to use the law to address the his-
torical imbalance in the treatment of girls and women in athletics in the
twentieth century. Although men played some role in that historical im-
balance, 6 the record shows that women physical educators controlled
athletic programs for women in and outside of educational institutions
during the first half of this century.27 Those women held and were influ-
enced by the now discredited view-some prefer the term "myth"-that
"women were too fragile to engage in strenuous physical contests. 2z8
They, accordingly, designed athletic programs for women that empha-
sized exercise. Furthermore, they abhorred the commercialization of the
male intercollegiate competition model and therefore minimized compe-
tition.29 Athletic programs in high school systems mimicked the col-
legiate systems. The result was a dearth of competitive opportunities
and resources for women.
The historical record for Black women is somewhat similar, but var-
ies to some degree. They started defying the taboos against women par-
ticipating in physically strenuous competitive sports after World War I.
Tuskegee Institute established an extremely successful women's track
program in 1927. ° Most of its competition came from northern track
clubs that were not affiliated with universities.31 Tennessee State Uni-
versity assumed the mantle at the end of World War II with its famous
Tigerbelles.3 2 I use the track programs as examples because of their his-
torical significance to Black womens sports. Sports for Black women
26. The Olympic movement did welcome them with open arms. Olson, supra note 1, at
109.
27. Id. at 110.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 2 ARTHUR R. Asrm, A HmAR ROAD TO GLORY 74-76 (1988).
31. Id. at 77. Wilberforce University was its major collegiate rival. Id at 78. Athletic
programs for men or women at the historically Black colleges at that time were few in
number. Id. at 74.
32. Id. at 78.
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were affected by general attitudes on women's athletics.33 However, an
equally, if not more important barrier to the participation of Black wo-
men in athletics was the necessity of work. 34
The term "females" is broad enough to include Black girls and wo-
men, yet other factual circumstances indicate that the "essential" girls
and women contemplated by gender equity laws are white. Most current
legal discourse dwells exclusively on Title IX. I, however, will begin with
the Equal Protection Clause because it provides the jurisprudential un-
derpinnings for gender equity principles, and Section 1983 because it was
used by litigants prior to Title IX. Governmental involvement may con-
stitute the plane of activity, but the dimension on that plane which gives
rise to the litigation is gender. Equal Protection jurisprudence fre-
quently has been used by girls and women to obtain the right to partici-
pate in athletics.
Gender equity case law under the Equal Protection Clause fre-
quently has arisen in cases involving school systems. At the high school
level, application of the Equal Protection Clause leads to the basic prop-
osition that whatever sport a school district makes available to one gen-
der must be made available to the other. The proposition is the rule
when girls sue but it is not always the rule when boys sue. It seems that
school districts already offer ample participation opportunities for boys
and the courts are trying to increase the participation opportunities for
girls. So to some extent a constitutional rule favoring girls but not boys
may be justified as a rule for the remediation of past discrimination.36
33. For example, two barnstorming Black womens basketball teams emerged after World
War I, both of which used standard six-player half-court womens rules. Id. at 45.
34. Carole A. Oglesby, Myths and Realities of Black Women in Sport, in BLAcK WOMEN
IN SPORT 5 (T. Green et. al. eds, 1981). Arthur Ashe provides an historical account of the
1920s:
Most Black women spent very little time in competitive organized sport. They worked
in the home with few appliances of convenience. There were no washers and dryers, no
dishwashers, no disposable diapers, and the average workday was twelve hours long.
In the South, two-thirds of all Black women who worked outside their own homes did
so as domestics in the homes of whites. The only time for recreation were Sunday and
Saturday afternoons.
Ashe, supra note 30, at 75.
35. Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Hoover v.
Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D.Colo. 1977). Courts have split over whether schools must do
the same for boys. Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 612 A.2d 734 (R.I. 1992)
(boys do not have right to participate on girls teams); Williams v. School Dist. of Bethlehem,
799 F. Supp. 513 (E.D.Pa. 1992), rev'd, 998 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1993), cert denied, 114 S.Ct. 689
(1994) (boys have the right to participate on girls teams).
36. However, a school district that has a well developed program for girls does not have a
defense if a girl wants to play a sport that is only offered to boys.
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The remediation of past discrimination also explains the judicial and
regulatory interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX to
permit "separate but equal" teams based on gender. By permitting girls
only teams, a school district necessarily discriminates on the basis of gen-
der, but does so in order to increase the participation opportunities of-
fered to girls. Yet, the existence of separate teams raises questions about
the extent to which gender equity also encompasses the quality of partic-
ipation opportunities. Some girls in some sports are capable of compet-
ing with the boys. They should be allowed to do so if the assumption
that the boys' competition offers a higher level of competition is true.37
These legal rules surely have meant more athletic opportunities for
Black girls. They have increased opportunities in secondary school sys-
tems. They can participate in whatever athletic programs are operated
by schools located in their communities, including basketball, field
hockey, golf, lacrosse, fast and slow pitch softball, soccer, tennis, track
and wrestling. Such participation allows them to obtain the training and
skill development necessary to move on to higher levels of competition
at the collegiate level. Moreover, even though professional sports op-
portunities in the United States are limited, there is Olympic competi-
tion available and professional opportunities abroad. The probability of
women making an Olympic team may be less than that of men making it
to professional sports competition because the Olympics occur once
every four years.
Section 1983 constraints also arise out of Equal Protection jurispru-
dence and are triggered by the presence of government sponsorship or
the use of public facilities. Thus, girls are permitted to play in Little
Leagues that use municipal ballfields. 38 Black girls benefit from these
rules as well. They have the right to participate in athletic competition
organized by noneducational institutions for boys if separate teams are
not available. Thus, they have the right to play on Little League Base-
ball teams and Midget League Ice Hockey teams. Here again, they may
have opportunities for training and development in sports such as bas-
ketball, figure skating, golf, gymnastics, soccer, softball and tennis where
37. Yellow Springs Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of. Educ. v. Ohio H.S. Athletic
Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1981); O'Connor v. Board of Education, 545 F. Supp. 376 (N.D.
Ill. 1982); Ritacco v. Norwin School Dist., 361 F.Supp. 930 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
38. Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1975) (Little League
utilizing public park may not exclude on the basis of gender under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); accord
Nat'l Org. of Women v. Little League Baseball. Inc., 318 A.2d 33 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1974) (Little League exclusion on the basis of gender invalidated under state public accommo-
dations statute).
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available. As their skills develop, those Black girls who participate have
upward mobility to higher levels of competition within the respective
amateur systems.
Neither the use of the Equal Protection Clause nor section 1983 to
advance the position of girls alleviates the force of racial discrimination
acting upon Black girls in the sports context. The gender equity jurispru-
dence gives them the right to participate where there are opportunities;
it does not create opportunities in general where there are not already
existing opportunities for boys or require the expenditure of resources
where they are not already expended for boys. To the extent that Black
boys lack opportunities or resources as a result of racism, gender equity
often provides no remedy for Black girls.
Without question, Title IX's single axis is gender. Although the legis-
lative history for the law is sparse, contemporaneous writings about the
legislation as it applies in the sports' context indicate that a major objec-
tive of the law was the correction of an imbalance in the treatment of
girls and women. The legislation, however, is limited; it applies only on
the plane of sports produced by educational institutions that receive fed-
eral funding. The statutory command is simple: "Educational institu-
tions do for girls and women what you do for men and boys."
Moreover, the nature of the law's command adds another limitation.
The law constrains individual educational institutions with respect to
girls and women who are their students.39 Thus, Black girls and women
receive the benefits of the law only with respect to the institutions at
which they matriculate at any point in time.40
At the time Title IX was enacted, the law's command "Educational
institutions do for girls and women what you do for men and boys"
meant a rather pernicious reality for Black girls and women. The Amer-
39. Gender equity law is directed toward institutional compliance and not societal compli-
ance. Theoretically, gender equity in collegiate athletics exists when every college, university
and junior college is in compliance. Even if every institution were in compliance with Title IX,
the opportunities for Black women would vary from institution to institution.
40. See Wilde, supra note 9, at 251-53 for an interesting institutional based gender equity
compliance model. His model does not review the implications for Black women or other
women of color. Wilde, in reviewing contemporary institutional responses to gender equity
compliance, notes that one institution, Brooklyn College, dropped its athletic program. Id- at
244. I venture to say that if every institution of higher learning dropped its athletic program,
organized athletic competition for men would still exist. Somehow the conceptual boundaries
of the institutionalized obligation to achieve gender equity does not work for me. Some read-
ers may assert that it is unlikely that all institutions, or even a significant number of institu-
tions, would go as far as Brooklyn College. However, other forces within major college
athletics are, in fact, leading to divestiture of the mens' revenue producing sports and building
momentum at this very moment.
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ican educational system at all levels was highly segregated. Despite vast
changes in the political ethos and special admissions policies, that condi-
tion largely continues.4 ' White girls would have been entitled to
whatever their white school or university did for boys and Black girls
would have been entitled to whatever their Black school or university
did for boys. Most participation opportunities at the collegiate level
were at predominantly white colleges; most resources were at predomi-
nantly white universities. The same picture existed at the elementary
and secondary school level.
But all did not stay the same. The Civil Rights Era saw increased
efforts to use the legal system to combat the force of racial discrimina-
tion. De jure racial segregation in America was invalidated under the
Equal Protection Clause in Brown v. Board of Education.42 Congress
continued the attack with several pieces of civil rights legislation, one of
which was Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.41 Title VI prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race in educational systems receiving fed-
eral funds. Elementary and secondary schools were desegregated by ju-
dicial decree. Race based affirmative action policies in admissions were
adopted at most predominantly white NCAA institutions.
Black women benefitted from these efforts along with Black men.
The legal tools to fight the forces of racial discrimination did not, how-
ever, regulate the force of gender discrimination confronting Black wo-
men. This was true in the sports setting as well. When Title IX was
added to the antidiscrimination arsenal of Black women, they should
have immediately reaped significant benefits in the sports arena. Instead
a remarkable irony occurred.
Integration provided white educational institutions with access to the
elite Black male athletes at all levels of the educational system. 4 Since
athletic programs in those days favored men, notwithstanding Title IX,
the white educational system increased the number of athletic participa-
tion opportunities for which Black males were eligible to compete.45 No
41. See generally JONATHAN KoZOL, SAVAGE INEOuALrrms (1991) (on contemporary
segregation in public school systems); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United
States v. Fordice: Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1401,
1409-10 (1993). See also Davis, supra note 10, in which the author describes the history of
racially segregated sports in the United States and argues that racism continues to affect inter-
collegiate athletics.
42. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
44. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
45. When formerly exclusively white sports systems open their doors to Blacks, its Black
counterpart often dies. That was the case of Major League Baseball. Some of this happened
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longer were they limited to competing for the participation opportunities
in the historically Black universities, but they were then eligible to com-
pete for opportunities in historically white institutions as well. White
men, who previously had been able to compete for those opportunities
without competition, would have been displaced, not by women, but by
Black men, unless universities expanded their athletic programs. Laws
regulating the force of racial discrimination also provided Black women
with the right to compete for those opportunities that were available to
women in predominantly white universities. They had an equal right to
compete for participation opportunities that were in very short supply.
Even though more Black women are in college than Black men, Title
IX did not, and does not, mean that Black women are entitled to the
same treatment as Black men, except at the historically Black universi-
ties. Historically, Black colleges and universities are subject to the man-
date of Title IX.46 To the extent that Title IX requires participation
numbers to mirror the gender composition of an institution's student
body, Black women would be entitled to more participation opportuni-
ties than Black men at many historically Black institutions. A predomi-
nantly white university, on the other hand, need not provide Black
women with participation opportunities that mirror the gender composi-
tion of its Black student body. Because such an institution may comply
with Title IX by increasing participation opportunities for white women,
it is possible that Black women suffer no gender discrimination at the
hands of a university which so complied.
I am not saying that Title IX has not been beneficial to Black women
for, indeed, it has. It has increased their participation opportunities at
the collegiate level. In 1978, for example, there were 1,012 Black women
participating as athletes in intercollegiate athletics out of 17,298 women
with integration in the educational systems. Black leagues at the secondary level were abol-
ished as the Black schools that sponsored them were closed. Black college sports survive,
because Black colleges survived integration. Some Black noneducational sport systems also
have survived. The American Tennis Association, which produced Arthur Ashe, Althea Gib-
son and numerous others, was formed in 1916 and is the oldest Black sports organization in
the United States. Eric Smith, A.T.A. Junior Development Program, BLACK ENERPRISE,
Sept. 1995, at 115.
46. Athletic programs at historically Black institutions have their problems with gender
equity compliance. South Carolina State University's program was certified conditionally by
the NCAA in 1995; the condition: adopt a plan to improve the graduation rate of women
athletes. Sal Ruibal, Craven drives off with rookie award, USA TODAY, Nov. 17, 1995, at 3C.
Howard Universiy lost a significant sex discrimination suit in 1993 involving the coach of its
women's basketball team. Christine Brennan & Mark Asher, Title IX Award Stirs National
Reaction: $2.4 Million to Howard Women's Basketball Coach, THE WAsH. PosT, June 26, 1993.
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in some 213 colleges and universities surveyed. 47 Another study found
2,760 Black women on athletic scholarships in NCAA Division 1 institu-
tions in the 1990-91 school year.' I am saying that the efficacy of Title
IX to remedy the historical station of Black women in sports is limited.
Since most universities provide more participation remedies and re-
sources to sports for men, Title IX requires universities to increase the
opportunities available for, and the resources, expended on women in
their intercollegiate athletic programs. Accordingly, many colleges and
universities have sought to comply by adding sports for women to com-
ply with Title IX's definition of equality as equal participation numbers
and resources. The NCAA, which opposed the enactment of Title IX,49
has now elevated gender equity to a major governing principle.50 That
principle is also oriented to the single axis of gender. As part of its re-
demption, the NCAA created a task force which issued a report in
1993.5' The NCAA Gender-Equity Task Force identified several sports
for women that universities may consider for compliance purposes.
These included ice hockey, rowing, synchronized swimming, team hand-
ball, water polo, archery, badminton, bowling and squash.52 Black wo-
men in the inner city and from low-income backgrounds do not have
access to the training and development necessary to compete for col-
legiate opportunities.53
Congress has been inconsistent in its attention to the intersectionality
issue. The Student Right to Know Act compels universities to report the
graduation rates of student athletes by race and sex.54 But the Equity in
47. Debra E. Blum, Forum Examines Discrimination Against Black Women in College
Sports, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDuC., Apr. 21, 1993, at A39.
48. Robertha Abney and Dorothy L. Richey, Opportunities for Minority Women in
Sport-The Impact of Title IX, J. PHYS. ED. RIc. & DANCE, Mar. 1992, at 56.
49. NCAA v. Califano, 444 F. Supp. 425 (D.Kan. 1978), rev'd, 622 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir.
1980).
50. NCAA CONST. art. 2.3 (1995-96).
51. Final Report of the NCAA Gender-Equity Task Force, National Collegiate Athletic
Association (July 26, 1993).
52. NCAA Gender-Equity Task Force, Achieving Gender Equity A Basic Guide to Title
IX for Colleges and Universities 51 (1994). Interestingly, bowling was the most popular sport
of Black women after World War II. A 1981 compilation showed that Black women had high
participation in three sports: basketball, track and field, and volleyball. That same compila-
tion showed that Black women had very low participation numbers in most, if not all, of the
emerging sports. Tina Sloan Green et al., Real Problems and Real Solutions, in BLAcK Wo-
MEN IN SPORT, supra note 34, at 49.
53. Tina Sloan Greene, The Future of Black Women in Sport, in BLACK WOMEN IN SPORT,
supra note 34, at 71.
54. Pub. L. 101-542, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(e) (Supp. 1995).
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Athletics Disclosure Act (Equity Act)55 uses the single axis approach
requiring universities to disclose financial data along gender lines. At
the same time and in the same legislation in which it adopted the Equity
Act, Congress also passed the Women's Educational Equity Act of
1994.56 That law explicitly employs a multiple dimension approach and
provides that its purposes include the promotion "of equity in education
for women and girls who suffer from multiple forms of discrimination
based on sex, race, ethnic origin, limited-English proficiency, disability,
or age." 57
B. Multiple Dimensions
My writing about the effect of the forces of racial and gender discrim-
ination on Black women in the athletic arena arrives rather late. One
Black woman scholar and athlete wrote in 1981 with defiance and hope:
"[B]lack women deal with the double burden/challenge of prejudice con-
cerning both sex and race."'58 What I have added above are the insights
provided by Professors Crenshaw and Harris on the inefficacy of laws,
like Title IX, that separately target the force of gender discrimination to
remedy harm caused by a confluence of the forces or by a unique force
of discrimination against Black women. 9 I also have offered proof of
their further observation that the conjunction of laws which separately
target gender or racial discrimination do not provide an adequate rem-
edy either. That result should occur if the confluence of the forces or a
unique force generates harm to Black women not produced by either
force independently of each other. An understanding of the true nature
of the discriminatory force or forces, thus, is essential to the develop-
ment of antidiscrimination jurisprudential theory, but more importantly,
it aids the development of a remedy for that harm.
I have already demonstrated that Black women do suffer from the
confluence of gender and racial discrimination forces in the sports con-
text. Let me summarize. Black women have had to overcome two spe-
cific prohibitions: "No Blacks Allowed" and "No Women Allowed."60
Black women are adversely affected by both signs, yet taking down the
55. Pub. L. 103-382, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(g) (Supp. 1995).
56. Pub. L. 103-382, § 101,108 Stat. 3695, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 7231 etseq. (Supp. 1995).
57. 20 U.S.C. § 7232(3) (Supp. 1995).
58. Oglesby, supra note 34, at 1.
59. I have provided a cursory argument that laws specifically targeting racial discrimina-
tion also do not provide an adequate remedy.
60. Racism and sexism connote more than discriminatory exclusion. They include a wide
range of discriminatory behavior. See generally Davis, supra note 10.
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former sign does not prevent or remedy the harm caused by the latter.
Nor does removing the latter prevent or remedy the harm caused by the
former. Finally, removing both signs does not remedy the harm caused
by the effect of both signs together.
The more difficult case is whether there exists a unique force aimed
directly at Black women. Consider the case of an express prohibition
against the participation of Black women. What if a particular sporting
activity had a "No Black Women Allowed" policy? At first glance, the
obvious conclusion is that such a prohibition can not stand. If it were so
obvious, the articles by Professors Crenshaw and Harris, while they may
have been written in the pursuit of intellectual curiosity, would have
been unnecessary. In fact, this type of policy is the subject of DeGraffen-
reid v. General Motors,61 a Title VII case cited by Professor Crenshaw in
which the court refused to recognize Black women as a suspect class
apart from Black men.
This issue was tackled in Shuford v. Alabama State Board of Educa-
tion,' involving both Title VII and Title IX. In Shuford, a Black male
brought a class action suit under Title VII challenging employment and
promotion practices relating to presidential, faculty, administrative, and
supervisory positions in a state's postsecondary educational system.
Prior to the approval of a consent decree settling the racial discrimina-
tion claims, four women intervened to raise similar employment related
sex discrimination claims under Title VII and Title IX. Two Black wo-
men also intervened on behalf of a sub-class of "Black female profes-
sionals." The court allowed the Black women to intervene and in
approving a modification of the original consent decree recognized that
Black women were subjected to a unique form of discrimination.63
The existence of a unique form of discrimination directed specifically
at Black women was also recognized in Jefferies v. Harris County Com-
munity Action Association.64 My point though is that even if a unique
force may exist, the injury caused by it does not appear to be different
61. 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff'd and rev'd in part, 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977).
62. 897 F. Supp. 1535 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
63. "The sub-class of black women is a distinct group, subject to discrimination based on a
dual status as blacks and women that neither white women nor black men receive." Id. at
1568. Judge Thompson relied upon his own precedent, Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n,
766 F.Supp. 1052, 1099 n.131 (M.D.Ala. 1990), for this conclusion. In that footnote, he wrote:
Black female officers employed by the Sheriff's Department are in an especially preca-
rious position because they are subjected to both sexual and racial harassment...
[T]hey are also subjected to additional discrimination because of their dual status
which neither the white female officers nor the black male officers must bear.
64. 615 F.2d 1025, 1032-35 (5th Cir. 1980).
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from the harm caused by the confluence of forces. While the "No Blacks
Allowed" sign also affected Black men and the "No Women Allowed"
sign also affected white women, only Black women were adversely af-
fected by both signs. Similarly, the "No Black Women" sign only affects
Black women. This was indeed the point made by Jefferies. The harm
may not, in fact, be different from that incurred by Black men who suffer
from racial discrimination or white women who suffer from gender dis-
crimination. The key question is whether the law will provide a remedy
to Black women when they are the only ones who suffer harm, regard-
less of its magnitude and scope, from a specific confluence or type of
discriminatory force.65
The problems of harm and remedy as they apply to Black women can
not be fully comprehended without some picture of the multiple dimen-
sions of the sports landscape. Organized sports competition in the
United States may be divided into amateur and professional sports. The
law of gender equity has been developed largely in the area of amateur
athletics. Amateur athletics can be divided into two systems: athletics
sponsored by educational institutions and athletics sponsored by non-
educational institutions.66 Although the formal structures of both sys-
tems are separate, athletes may move in and out of both systems almost
at will. Moreover, both systems have competitive levels ranging from
beginners to elite.67 As athletes age and improve their skills levels, they
65. "Recognition of black females as a distinct protected subgroup... is the only way to
identify and remedy discrimination directed toward black females." Id at 1035.
66. Olson argues that Title IX is flawed because it is limited to the educational system.
Olson, supra note 1, at 107. Her characterization of sports regulated by noneducational insti-
tutions as the recreational system misses the mark. Id at 115. As shown in the text, the
noneducational amateur system offers highly competitive athletics as well. Heckman similarly
refers to noneducational systems as "community recreational leagues or programs."
Heckman, supra note 3, at 5. Not all such programs or leagues are part of a formal competi-
tive system.
67. The most visible of the noneducational systems is the Olympic system governed by the
United States Olympic Committee created in 1950. The USOC was established as the "coor-
dinating body for amateur athletic activity in the United States directly relating to interna-
tional amateur athletic competition" by the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, P.L. 95-606, 92 Stat.
3045. H.R.Rep. No. 95-1627, 95th Cong.2d Sess. 14 (1978). That act resolved some of the
jurisdictional squabbles between the NCAA and the Amateur Athletic Union, another
noneducational sports organization with a long history in amateur sports in the United States.
Underneath the USOC, amateur sports at all levels are regulated by numerous sport specific
organizations. The result is recreational and competitive leagues governed by non-profit as-
sociations as well as those sponsored by municipalities. Players graduate from Little League
Baseball to Civic League to the American Legion. In the school system, players may begin in
junior high school, then high school, then college. Some players may participate in both sys-
tems. Players may move out of the amateur systems at the American Legion or high school
level. Girls may begin in Little League, but often move up in fast or slow pitch softball.
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advance to higher levels. The Olympics and professional sports consti-
tute the highest levels.68 There is a third system: the playground.69 The
playground provides competition that generally is devoid of adult super-
vision and organization. The playground provides a brutal but support-
ive environment for skill development. There is no practice. Feedback
comes from the repetitious playing of games. The better playground
players have upward mobility into higher levels of organized competi-
tion, especially those sponsored by educational institutions.
Historically, all three amateur systems have been racially segregated.
The racial practices of those systems can not be separated from the
broader society. Thus, Black athletes, male and female, were largely ex-
cluded from white collegiate and higher level noneducational amateur
systems until the World War II era outside the South and the Civil
Rights Era in the South.70 The opportunity to compete for participation
opportunities in white secondary systems and the lower levels of the
noneducational systems came in the Civil Rights Era.7 ' Until then,
Organizations such as the United States Figure Skating Association sanction competitions
from beginners to the Olympic level.
68. Professional sports are generally not available for women. There are two quadrennial
Olympics: summer and winter. The winter Olympics feature sports which Black women his-
torically have not had access due to financial or other socio-economic reasons.
69. The playground is used loosely to describe any sort of recreational sports competition
which is not organized into formal competition. It may be made available in municipal parks,
recreation centers, country clubs, etc.
70. Davis, supra note 10, at 633 nn. 81 & 85. The participation of Black athletes in white
colleges in the North existed prior to World War II, but increased substantially in the 1930s.
Restrictions also existed in noneducational amateur systems. See Farrall v. Dist. of Colum.
Amateur Athletic Union, 153 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (in which Blacks challenged a rule
prohibiting mixed race competitions in the District of Columbia). The integration of Black
males into the predominantly white collegiate system in the South began in earnest after
events of the 1960s, such as Texas Western University's (now University of Texas at El Paso)
victory in the 1966 NCAA basketball championship with an all Black starting five. Integration
had begun in southern programs before the University of Southern California defeated the
University of Alabama in 1970. However, Paul "Bear" Bryant's quote still looms large: Sam
Cunningham, the USC fullback, "just did more for integration in the South in 60 minutes than
Martin Luther King did in 20 years." Mark Blaudschun, Removing the Barrier, BosToN
GLOBE, Aug. 26, 1994, at 40.
71. In the South prior to Civil Rights Era, the separate school systems had their own
regulatory association. For example, white secondary schools in Virginia belonged to the Vir-
ginia High School League and Black schools belonged to the Virginia Interscholastic Associa-
tion. Tom Robinson, A League of Their Own, THE VmoIxNLA-PiLoT AND THm LEDGER-
STAR, Feb. 22, 1993, at C1. The two leagues did not merge until 1969. Id. One of the early
Equal Protection cases in sports law involved the attempt by a Black private school to join the
white Louisiana High School Athletic Association. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n v.
St. Augustine High School, 396 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1968). Similar issues arose in noneduca-
tional amateur systems as well.
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Black athletes had no alternative but to develop in the Black amateur
system. Not only were the educational systems segregated, but so were
residential neighborhoods. 72 Notwithstanding Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation73 and a vast array of civil rights laws and judicial precedents, sepa-
rate systems continue to exist. College athletic conferences are still
comprised exclusively of either historically white institutions or histori-
cally Black institutions.74 Although de jure all Black primary and secon-
dary schools have disappeared, such schools continue to exist because of
residential segregation, which has actually increased.75
Neighborhoods, regardless of their racial or ethnic character, have
decidedly pronounced socio-economic dynamics. The resources avail-
able in all three systems are a function of those dynamics. Athletic com-
petition in affluent neighborhoods will have more resources available.
Conversely, athletic competition in low-income neighborhoods will have
far lesser resources available. Resource allocation affects the quality of
the facilities for training and playing the competitions, the availability of
coaching as well as the preparation of individual coaches for their work
and the types of athletic competition available. All of these factors influ-
ence the sports in which children in the neighborhood may have upward
mobility. The more affluent the neighborhood in which a girl grows up,
the more participation opportunities she will have available at the upper
levels.
The case of the express prohibition in the sports context is merely
hypothetical. History shows that black women have been elite athletes
in the educational and noneducational amateur systems. The late Ar-
thur Ashe in his seminal work, A Hard Road to Glory: A History of the
African-American Athlete 1919-1945, recounted the record of Black wo-
men as amateurs and professionals in basketball and baseball, track, ten-
nis and bowling. Wilma Rudolph in track and Althea Gibson in tennis
are legends. Any authoritative history of African-American women will
also include such names as Alice Coachman, Wyomia Tyus and Ora
Washington. Contemporary names include Zina Garrison, Flo Hyman,
Florence Griffin Joyner, Jackie Joyner-Kersee, Lori McNeil, Cheryl
Miller, Debi Thomas, and Gwen Torrence.
72. Some park systems maintained by municipalities were also segregated. See Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
73. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
74. See generally OCANLA CHAx, BLACK COLLEGE SPORT (1976) for, among other
things, a history Black college intercollegiate competition in baseball and football.
75. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., How Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent Integration: Destabi-
lizing Race as a Vehichle to Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1595 (1995).
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Like all women, their current athletic opportunities are a function of
the historical suppression of competitive athletics for women. That
means they face fewer participation opportunities at the higher competi-
tive levels and smaller amounts of resources. Like all women, they face
very limited professional opportunities when they reach the amateur
peak. The dearth of opportunities is compounded by the historical seg-
regation of Black athletics from white athletics. The Black system was
deprived of resources but not the competitive spirit. Black women were
locked into a system that did not offer them very many opportunities as
women and when it did it had very few resources for them.
Like Black men, they encounter stereotyping and stacking76 within
the sports world which steers them into basketball and track.77 The
steering into basketball and track and away from other sports reduces
the participation opportunities for which they may compete. The prob-
lem goes beyond racial steering. Training and development at the higher
levels of competition in other sports depend upon access to the lower
levels of organized competition in those sports. Sports such as ice
hockey, field hockey, tennis, and golf have socio-economic dimensions
that limit their accessibility to Black girls at the lower levels of the ama-
teur systems. There are no public facilities and private country and rec-
reation clubs are out of the question. These barriers will fall only when
they have access to the lower level systems that train and develop ath-
letes for competition at the higher levels. Increasing the opportunities at
the higher levels provides role models for young Black girls, but the
power of the role models is limited. The impact of this structural prob-
lem on Black men is muted by the presence of football. 78 Like Black
76. Stacking is the term used to describe the assignment of Black players in some sports to
particular positions that stereotypically utilize natural ability and white players to those that
stereotypically require thinking. Norman R. Yetman & D. Stanley Eitzen, Racial Dynamics in
American Sport: Continuity and Change, in SPORT rN. CoNTENiPoRARY SocIETY 325-32 (1984);
see also Oglesby, supra note 34, at 7, where author discusses stacking of Black women.
77. This has been an historical problem. One commentator wrote in 1981 of the clustering
of Black women in basketball and track along with the expectation that Black women be
super athletes. Oglesby, supra note 34, at 5-6. The stereotyping still prevails. Blum, supra
note 47, at A39.
78. Football programs offer a large number of participation opportunities. The numbers
of players on the field at any one time, eleven, is large. Platooning players on offense and
defense results in at least twenty-two starters. Then add to that a punter, a field goal kicker
and a special team for punts and kick-offs and the numbers grow even larger before the substi-
tutes are even considered. Since many boys are willing to participate merely as practice play-
ers, big time programs carry teams of over 100 players. Wilde, supra note 9, at 249. Black
males are steered into football and stacked into the "skill" positions. The net effect is that
football provides participation opportunities that compensate on an over-all basis, but not on
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men, they face discrimination in obtaining coaching and administrative
positions in universities and governing bodies. 79
However, their participation levels at the high school and the col-
legiate stages lag behind other identifiable categories of women and
men.80 And Black women, as a group, appear to derive the least amount
of benefits from athletic participation.81 Theories for these differences
abound, including the necessity of work and the absence of professional
sports.' My own hypothesis is that their participation opportunities are
also adversely affected by discrimination specifically aimed at Black wo-
men. In a racially integrated setting, they may not be selected for teams
at higher rates than other groups because they are often viewed as wo-
men who least typify the essentialist norm.8 3 The racial steering argu-
ment lends support to this conclusion. As Black women are steered into
some sports, they are steered away from others. The participation of
Black women may also be affected by the availability of adult supervi-
sion and training when they are girls.
II. BLACK WOMEN EQUITY - TBE REMEDY
In this section, I hope to provide a general framework for the devel-
opment of legal rules and sports policy for the equitable treatment of
an individual basis, for the small number of opportunities made available to them in other
sports.
79. The lack of upward mobility in coaching and administrative positions is a major issue
with Black women athletes. Addressing this issue is a priority of the Black Women in Sports
Foundation. See comments of Tina Sloan Green and Dr. Alpha Alexander in Bob Molinaro,
Fight is on vs. 'Isms in Colleges, Tim VIRGINIAN--PILOT AND Tim LEDGER-STAR, Sept. 19,
1993, at Dl. The lack of such opportunities somewhat epitomizes the failure of Title IX and
gender equity to address their grievances. The Cheryl Miller/Marianne Stanley controversy is
a case on point. Cheryl Miller is, perhaps, the greatest player in the history of womens inter-
collegiate basketball. She was subjected to derision by the gender equity establishment, how-
ever, when she agreed to accept the head coaching position at her alma mater, the University
of Southern California. The position was available because Marianne Stanley, her predeces-
sor, was dismissed in a contract dispute in which she demanded that she be paid compensation
comparable to the coach of the mens basketball program. For details, see USC's Miller in a
Touchy Situation, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Dec. 8, 1993, at D2; Vic Dorr, Jr., Despite Departure of
Stars, Program at Maryland Shines, RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, Dec. 2, 1993, at C6.
80. Olson, supra note 1, at 127-29.
81. Crenshaw, supra note 14, at 139-40.
82. See text supra at 10-11 and supra note 14.
83. Olson writes about the mainstream history of the dilemma women athletes faced in
enjoying their participation and also gaining acceptance as women. Olson, supra note 1, at
119. She does not add the racial dimension on this point. Oglesby, perhaps, touched on this
point when she wrote of the invisibility Black female athletes. "This monograph had [James]
Baldwin not hit upon the idea first, could very well be titled, 'Nobody knows 'her' name: the
black American sportswoman.'" Oglesby, supra note 34, at 1.
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Black women in sports. I will begin with a critique of the application of
the equality model upon which Title IX is founded. One difficulty with
the equality model is that it is limited to the remediation of inequality.
The model defines the problem to solved. The law is asked to fix the
inequality and little else. In the sports context, the model presents some
inherent conceptual conundrums where participants seek superiority.
The conceptual difficulty is compounded in the case of Black women,
where an Equal Protection analysis not only requires the delineation of a
suspect class84 but also a privileged class with which to compare it.
Where the landscape fuses the dimension of race with their gender, it
is not so difficult to find a suspect class. Blacks qualify as a protected
group and women also often qualify. A subgroup of persons belonging
to both should have stronger claims to protected status. As Professor
Crenshaw demonstrates, existing law often provides a much weaker
claim to protected status for such subgroups. Such results are easy to
comprehend if one focuses on broader principles. All persons have ra-
cial and gender classifications. A subgroup of persons belonging to both
groups include the privileged as well as the subordinated. The problem
is how to measure the harm addressed by the Equal Protection Clause.
What is the appropriate privileged group to compare an unprivileged
subgroup with?
In the sports context, the question would be if Black women as a
class are unprivileged, what is the appropriate privileged group? Gender
equity, for example, compares women with men. The rule of law largely
amounts to "Do for women what you do for men." How should the law
complete the following: "Do for Black women what you do for.... "?
Degraffenreid suggests that there is no appropriate comparison group.
In any event, I am not aware of any instance in which a court has con-
templated completing the sentence with white men.
The legal rule could provide that Black men are the comparison
group. In Shuford, the court essentially reached this result. The original
consent decree adopted an affirmative action program with goals for the
hiring and promotion of African-Americans. The court modified the de-
cree to establish goals for African-American women at fifty percent of
those set for African-Americans. In analyzing the reasonableness of
those goals, it compared African-American women only with African-
American men. To comply with a rule of "Do for Black women what
you do for Black men," a sports program, whether attached to an educa-
tional institution or a noneducational organization, would have to pro-
84. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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vide Black women the same right to participate, the same resources
available to Black men. This may be the theoretical rule, but I empha-
size theoretical, in practice. A city recreational program in the Black
community's inner city has to let girls, who include large numbers of
Blacks, participate in any organized program. Schools that are predomi-
nantly Black must allow girls, who invariably will be Black, to participate
with the boys or on teams for girls.
The sentence could be completed with women or white women.
Considering that Shuford also adopted goals for women in the modified
decree, it could have established goals for Black women by reference to
their proportion of women in the relevant pool, but it did not. A "Do
for Black women as you do white women" rule has some interesting per-
mutations. It would mean that sports programs in both amateur systems
would have to provide the same opportunities and resources that are
provided to white girls and women by those programs. White girls who
live in the suburbs may have more sports programs available to them
than are found in the inner city. They may have more resources avail-
able, more training opportunities, and better facilities. They may have
more sports in which they can ascend to higher levels of competition
within the amateur systems. Those same opportunities would have to be
provided to Black women.
Both of these rules reach inconsistent results in integrated settings.
The regulations under Title IX are premised upon the assumption that
interest and ability are evenly distributed across genders. No such as-
sumption exists about race. In fact, the opposite assumption is widely, if
not stereotypically, accepted as the norm. Black males, for example, are
disproportionately represented in collegiate athletics in football and bas-
ketball. Although Blacks comprise about six percent of the student pop-
ulation at predominantly white institutions, they-including Black
women-comprise over twenty percent of the student athlete popula-
tion, mainly in basketball and football.8 5 If the rule were "Do for Black
women as you do for Black men," predominantly white institutions
would have to give a disproportionate share of the womens positions to
Black women. 6 If the rule were "Do for Black women as you do for
85. Jeff Schulz, Lapchick Learns: Race Relations Still Far From Ideal, STAR-TRmUNE
(Minneapolis), Dec. 20,1992, at 05C. Data released by the NCAA in 1993 showed that partic-
ipation of Black athletes dropped from 27 percent before Proposition 48 went into effect to
23.5 percent in the 1986-87 academic year. Doug Tucker, NCAA Study Paints Bittersweet Pic-
ture for Black Athletes, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 2, 1993, at B01.
86. Black women do hold a disproportionate share of participation opportunities in sports
such as basketball and track.
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white women," then the law permits Black men to have more spots than
are given to Black women. Such disparate results are possible only be-
cause of the acceptance of "separate but equal" when it comes to
gender.
Neither the Equal Protection Clause nor Title IX compels any organ-
ization, educational institution, or government to offer a sports program.
It merely constrains any such programs offered or sponsored by a gov-
ernment or utilizing public facilities. Although separate gender based
teams in a sport are permissible, presumably an affected actor could
comply with the Equal Protection Clause simply by offering a uni-sex
sports program. The football problem8 is solved at the high school level
because girls must be allowed to play. Some girls avail themselves of this
right, but the number does not seem significant. There is much specula-
tion that girls and women would not fare well if the doctrine were aban-
doned, but no one really knows. In some sports, exceptionally talented
girls may, in fact, be better athletes than the boys who routinely occupy
seats on the bench.
Interestingly enough, the problem of remedy has surfaced in a case
involving a school policy recognizing unique harm incurred by Black
boys. In Garrett v. Board of Education,' the issue was whether the
Equal Protection Clause or Title IX permitted the school board to pro-
vide redress to the class of African-American boys in the school district.
The court was asked to consider African-American males as a protected
class. The school board had approved the establishment of "male only"
academies to address "the crisis facing African-American males mani-
fested by high homicide, unemployment and drop-out rates." 9 The
court's analysis is hampered somewhat by the school board's use of
"male only" when the academies were aimed specifically at Black boys.9°
The court rested its invalidation of the academies under the Equal
Protection Clause on the failure of the school board to demonstrate a
compelling state interest. Since Black girls suffered harms similar to the
harm suffered by Black boys which the school board sought to remedy,
the court saw that remedy as imposing an additional harm on Black girls.
The remedy, according to the court, blamed Black girls as the causal
agent of the harm suffered by the boys.
87. Womens sports have no counterpart in sports for football, at least in the educational
system. Wilde, supra note 9, at 249. The participation levels of girls and women in figure
skating, perhaps, comes as close as any women's sport does to football.
88. 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
89. ld at 1007.
90. Id
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The Title IX reasoning in Garrett followed a different path. The
court's analysis was much more single axis oriented, much less accepting
of the classifications. However, the court used a reverse discrimination
approach (my characterization, not the court's). The opinion does not
reflect that the court appreciated the idea that Black boys might also
suffer from a confluence of discriminatory forces or a unique force di-
rected specifically at them. If so, the harm may be similar to that suf-
fered by either force alone or as someone else suffers. It nevertheless
remains true that the Black boys may have suffered in a way that only
they could. Black girls may have suffered a similar injury but as a result
of different discriminatory forces. Even though the harm may have been
similar, the severity and precise contours may also have been different.
That is the argument of Black women. If they so suffer, does the law,
does the equality model provide any remedy?
Under the court's analysis, a "No Black Boys," and by implication, its
counterpart, a "No Black Girls" restriction, presumably could be chal-
lenged and remedial efforts beyond invalidation of the restriction might
be upheld. The compelling state interest seems to be some sort of least
harmful means test. In a legal regime where equality of general classes
of people is prized, an effort to remedy a harm suffered by a narrow class
of people must be tailored to also benefit or not exacerbate inequalities
whose circumstances approximate or closely resemble the remedial class.
In Garrett, Black girls suffered similar injuries to the boys but from per-
haps different forces. The different forces conceptually make for differ-
ent causes of action, but the harm is so similar, and the forces so similar,
that equality model demands a remedy provided to one be provided to
the other, less the law create further inequality among them. I think this
point is made by Professor Crenshaw in her criticism of the refusal of
courts to allow Black women to be class representatives for classes (e.g.,
Black men or white women) who also suffer from discrimination.91
I have shown the inadequacy of the equality model. I am going to
sketch a general outline of an alternative regime. I have three basic pro-
posals. First, many questions of gender equity, and Black women equity
in particular, should be addressed primarily as questions of sports policy
and secondarily as legal questions. I advocate the development of
91. She might further argue, however, that the law could do more for Black women be-
cause of existing inequality between them and Black men. I do not think this imbalance exists
in all situations and the circumstances in Garrett are an example.
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unique legal rules in many sports settings. 92 My major complaint is that
the legal rules in many bodies of law arose to address peculiar settings
and policy considerations not necessarily found in the sports setting.
Those legal rules thus come to provide the structure for resolving essen-
tially sports problems and however awkward their application, often dic-
tate sports policy.
Second, I would explore the use of a general tort-like legal regime as
opposed to the equality model. The function at the junction results in
harm which under basic tort principles should have a remedy. A com-
pensatory damage model poses some conceptual difficulties in the sports
setting, but these difficulties are probably not as intractable as those in
the equality model. The law need only craft remedies that put Black
women in the position they would have been in if they had not been
injured by the confluence of forces or a unique discriminatory force.
That position can be found or estimated without using comparison
groups.93
Moreover, the tort model facilitates the incorporation of harm com-
pounded by multiple dimensional characteristics. The eggshell plaintiff
rule is an ancient precept in tort law.94 Remedial rules may consistently
with traditional doctrines specifically target Black women in all their
multiple dimensions. In doing so, Professor Harris's analysis cautions
against the adoption of the "essential Black woman," to which a tradi-
tional tort law approach may lead. Other dimensions, most notably
community and socio-economic status, must be considered.9 The dis-
proportionate impact of the necessity of work as a factor in the participa-
92. Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Intercollegiate Athletics and the Assignment of Legal
Rights, 39 ST. Louis L.J. 35, 39 (1990), in which I propose the development of a common law
of intercollegiate athletics.
93. Normative antidiscrimination law often looks to statistical disparity studies not only to
prove the amount of damages but show the occurrence of an injury. Affirmative Action, White
House Plan Would Halt New Set-Asides, Give Extra Credit to SDBs in Limited Instances, 65
Fed. Cont. Rptr. 11 (1996); Drew Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453,478-84 (1987). However,
it is not always necessary to use comparison groups to show the amount of damages. See, e.g.,
J.S. COVINGTON, CORPORATIONS 3-15 (1989), in which the author discusses various methods
for valuing businesses, including closely held firms, with no market for its ownership interests.
94. W. PAGE KEETONS ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43, at 291-
92 (5th ed. 1984). The basic eggshell or thin-skulled plaintiff rule is "the tortfeasor takes the
plaintiff as he finds him." Silva v. Stein, 527 So.2d 943 (Fla. App. 1988). The rule is ostensibly
premised on a victim with personal characteristics susceptible to harm beyond that which a
"normal person" would incur. Although the rule invokes abnormality, I wish to focus on its
use of the multiple personal characteristics of the victim. "Some scholars have interpreted the
thin skull doctrine to encompass the plaintiff's physical, mental, or financial condition."
Schaefer v. Hoffman, 831 P.2d 897, 900 (Colo. 1992).
95. Oglesby, supra note 34, at 4-5.
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tion of Black women in sports should be taken into account.96 Black
girls in the suburbs or more affluent neighborhoods and school districts
will have more opportunities and resources available than those in the
less affluent communities and school systems in the inner cities and rural
America. Accordingly, the sports programs targeting Black girls in the
inner city would look different from those developed in the suburbs or
rural communities. Professor Crenshaw similarly argues that antidis-
crimination law and politics "should be centered on the life chances and
life situations of people who should be cared about without regard to the
source of their difficulties." 97
Third, modern tort principles can be used as well. My approach
would not focus so much on the rights of individual Black women. There
is now a developed body of mass tort rules that may be used to fashion
large, broad based remedies. Such remedies would not be directed
solely at educational institutions. I would address the structure and in-
terrelationships of the amateur systems I have discussed above. Policies
must be developed to improve the access of Black girls to training and
development in the lower levels of a diverse range of sporting activi-
ties.98 Resources should be allocated to the neighborhoods in which
they grow up. If we target our efforts at Black girls, then Black women
will have greater opportunity at the higher levels. Title IX does apply to
the lower levels of educational systems, but it should be expanded to
reach the noneducational systems as well.99 Toward this end, I would
consider some combination of the educational and noneducational sys-
tems at the lower levels.100
96. Oglesby, supra note 34, at 5. I suspect that the need to work may also be a factor for
other women of color and some white women as well.
97. Crenshaw, supra note 14, at 166.
98. This point was raised by Carol A. Oglesby in The Future of Black Women in Sport, in
BLAcK WOMEN IN SPORT, supra note 34, at 71. A similar point was proffered by Olson when
she observed that Title IX does not provide direct benefits to women in the "recreational"
system.
99. The duties of national governing bodies approved by the USOC in specific sports
include the provision of "equitable support and encouragement for participation by women
where separate programs for male and female athletes are conducted on a national basis." 36
U.S.C. § 392(a)(6) (1992).
100. Solving gender equity problems necessarily requires the expenditure of resources.
Those who favor lower taxes and less government would probably oppose the use of tax dol-
lars for sports. When Congress enacted the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, it specifically recog-
nized that amateur sports in the United States are distinguishable from those in other
countries "by allowing amateur athletics to be a [sic] truly amateur in nature, free from Gov-
ernment funds and dominance." H.R. Rep. No. 95-1627, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1978). That
is not and was not a true statement, for both the educational and playground systems receive
substantial government funding. Perhaps the time has come to rethink how that spending is
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The mass tort approach would also recognize that inequities in the
allocation of resources in sports programs is a societal problem and
should be addressed as such. To the extent that such inequities have
resulted from governmental action, the states themselves, and not just
educational institutions, should bear some responsibility for the correc-
tion of the harm and problems caused thereby. It is a matter of histori-
cal record that states segregated Black women by race, and that the
states maintained amateur systems in educational institutions that
treated girls differently boys in sports programs. The provision of ath-
letic opportunity on an equitable basis to the extent supported by public
spending and policies should not be relegated solely to the federal direc-
tion and development.
Finally, I would customize legal rules and policies to fit the contours
of sports. In Yellow Springs Exempted Village School District Board of
Education v. Ohio High School Athletic Association, for example, the
regulatory association prescribed rules mandating separate gender teams
in middle and high schools to enhance compliance with Title IX by its
members.10 1 The appellate court held that the obligations of Title IX
were imposed on individual educational institutions. The court's inter-
pretation was a correct one. However, sports competition necessitates
the formation of such associations in order to produce high level athletic
competition. It does no good to order an institution to increase opportu-
nities if few other institutions act similarly. There are other aspects of
sport which should be taken into account.
IV. CONCLUSION
Black women are caught in a world that Title IX does not fully ad-
dress. As I have discussed above, young athletes develop in three sys-
tems. No law governs participation opportunities on the playground.
But athletes develop in the amateur systems and move up to higher
levels as they do. The number of sports in which Black girls can develop
competencies is a function of where they live and their socio-economic
circumstances. Suppressed opportunities at the lower levels affects the
number of athletic choices available at higher levels. There are opportu-
nities in basketball and track that are not very expensive to produce, but
the number of those opportunities at the upper levels is somewhat finite.
allocated. I do not advocate appropriation of the noneducational systems by the educational
systems. Rather, I am thinking of some form of partnership.
101. 647 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1981).
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Although I have focused on Black women, I have no doubt that simi-
lar issues may exist for all women of color. The impact of their multiple
dimensions may vary, and I would not presume that the precise rule that
helps Black women would also help Native American, Hispanic, or
Asian women. Inclusive policies would be directed specifically at their
needs as well. I believe that diversity of circumstances also exists among
white women and rules ought to target the specific needs of subgroups
based on their multiple dimensions.
I am not unmindful of the needs of men and the impact that the pro-
vision of resources to the development of opportunites for girls and wo-
men will have on them. It seems to me that the resolution of these
seemingly intractable problems is hindered by the way in which gender
equity is conceptualized. Using an equality model to resolve matters
causes us to define the problem to be resolved as one of inequality. As
usual in the sports world, a legal rule drives major issues of sports policy.
The time has come to rethink and redefine what is an American sports
problem. Our society, if athletic participation is a valued endeavor,
should boldly strive to provide the opportunity to all, whatever their cir-
cumstances or experiences may be, to obtain the maximum possible ben-
efits to be thereby derived.
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